Future Strategic Leaders’ Congress
Maritime Flashpoints: Australia’s Critical Vulnerabilities
22–24 May 2015

DELEGATE’S HANDBOOK
Security’s Future Strategic Leaders’ Program was established to foster the next generation of leaders to be valuable learning experiences. Setting, invite a number of security practitioners and researchers in a topic that is important for all. We are grateful to our guest presenters and time from their exceptionally busy with us. We also thank our sponsors, and the Noetic Group for their forward to working with you over the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Speaker(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1700-1800</td>
<td>Arrival, registration and unpack</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>Mr Peter Nicholson AO / Mr Drew McKinnie / Mr Brett Biddington AM, Institute For Regional Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1830</td>
<td>Pre-dinner drinks</td>
<td>Outside the Mess</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830-1930</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>Mess</td>
<td>Mr Lee Cordner AM, University of Adelaide</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930-1940</td>
<td>Welcome and weekend overview</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>Mr Andrew Gough RANR, Director General Navy Capability Plans and Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-2035</td>
<td>Session #1: Scene setting</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>Mr Peter Malpas, Braemar ACM Shipbroking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035-2135</td>
<td>Keynote Address</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>Dr Sanu Kainkara, Air Power Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2135-</td>
<td>Fireside drinks and discussions</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
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Saturday 23 May 2015

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0730-0830</td>
<td>Breakfast</td>
<td>Mess</td>
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<tr>
<td>0830-0930</td>
<td>Session #2: Why are SLoC critical to our national security and prosperity?</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>Mr Peter Malpas, Braemar ACM Shipbroking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930-0950</td>
<td>Session #2 Q&amp;A</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>Mr Sanu Kainkara, Air Power Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0950-1010</td>
<td>Morning Tea</td>
<td>Mess</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1010-1110</td>
<td>Session #3: What are the threats to Australia’s SLoC?</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>RADM (Rtd) Simon Cullen AM, CSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1110-1125</td>
<td>Session #3 Q&amp;A</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1125-1130</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
<td>(bring back to London shed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1130-1230</td>
<td>Syndicate Session #1</td>
<td>London Shed and break-out rooms</td>
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<tr>
<td>1230-1330</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>Mess</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-1430</td>
<td>Session #4: Global and Regional: Australia, South East Asia and SLoC</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
<td>Mr Ian Biggs, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430-1500</td>
<td>Session #4 Q&amp;A</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1500-1700</td>
<td>Afternoon tea then free time</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1700-1800</td>
<td>Syndicate session #2</td>
<td>London Shed</td>
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Congress Program

Saturday 23 May 2015 cont

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800-1900</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900-1945</td>
<td>Session #6: Best practices, challenges and lessons from international partnering in the Asia-Pacific region and Q&amp;A</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945-</td>
<td>Conversations in the breezeway</td>
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Sunday 24 May 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0730-0830</td>
<td>Breakfast</td>
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<tr>
<td>0830-0930</td>
<td>Key Note Address and Q&amp;A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930-0935</td>
<td>Tea / Coffee break (bring back to London shed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0935-1030</td>
<td>Session #7: What is the future of Australia’s maritime security and SLoC through our region? and Q&amp;A</td>
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<tr>
<td>1030-1100</td>
<td>Morning Tea</td>
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<tr>
<td>1100-1130</td>
<td>Syndicate session 2 cont / Panel Q&amp;A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130-1150</td>
<td>Congress Wrap-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1150-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pack up &amp; depart</td>
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Please note this program was current at time of printing – Friday 15 May 2015

Speakers and IFRS Directors

Mr Brett Biddington AM
Director, Institute For Regional Sec

Brett Biddington is the founder of a national company specialises in space and cyber security that addresses that Australia’s national security threats and vulnerabilities. He is the co-founder of the Australian Space Policy Institute (ASPI) and is a member of the Australian Government’s advisory committee on national security. He is an Adjunct Professor in the School of Government at the University of New South Wales, ADFA

In 2002 Brett left the Royal Australian Navy after 23 years of service. He was an intelligence officer, moving into capability development and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance projects including the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar (JODRA). He is an Adjunct Professor in the School of Government at the University of New South Wales, ADFA and Western Australia. In June 2012 he was admitted as a fellow of the Australian Institute of Australian Studies. He is a member of the Australian Defence Force Association and the Australian Institute of Management.

Between 2002 and 2007 Brett led the Australian Systems’ global space team.

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Professor Carl Thayer
Professor Emeritus, University of New South Wales (UNSW)
Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA)

Carlyle A. Thayer is Professor Emeritus at The University of New South Wales (UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra. He was educated at Brown University and holds an M.A. degree in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale and a PhD in International Relations from The Australian National University. Thayer joined the UNSW in 1979 and taught first in The Faculty of Military Studies at the The Royal Military College-Duntroon (1979-85) before transferring to UNSW@ADFA. He was given 'leave in the national interest' to take up the position of Deputy Chair of the Department of Regional Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii (1999-02). On return to Australia he was seconded to Deakin University and served as On-Site Academic Coordinator at Weston Creek for the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, the senior course, at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College (2002-04). He later directed Regional Security Studies at the Australian Command and Staff College (2006-07 and 2010).

Professor Thayer was the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in Washington (2005) and the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen F. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Center for International Studies, Ohio University (2008). He is also director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered in Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer is writes a regular column on Southeast Asia defence and security columnist for The Diplomat.

Professor Thayer is the author of over 500 publications including; Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, ASPI Strategy Report. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010.

Conduct of the Congress
The Congress will be conducted as a plenary and syndicate discussions.

The program will be broken into a number of sessions during which participants to work closely with Australian defence leaders in a relaxed environment over the weekend including:

- A series of presentations focusing on security issues facing Australia.
- Syndicate sessions - small group discussions with defence and industry leaders to discuss specific security issues.
- Informal discussions and "fireside chats"

We request you be at the appropriate time that the agenda and discussion can take place.

Discussions off-the-record
The Institute For Regional Security is committed to creating a trusted environment; so all discussions be strictly off-the-record and under embargo.

Dress Code
The dress code for the Congress will be casual.

In Confidence
The content of this Delegate Handbook, correspondence and information relating to the Congress and by wearing your badge, remain In-Confidence and will not be discussed in public.

Security
Given the array of dignitaries attending the Congress and by carrying photographic identity cards, attendees and organisers by carrying photographic identity cards; the Congress and by wearing your badge, remain In-Confidence and will not be discussed in public.

Mobile Phone Coverage
Mobile phone coverage is limited to some parts of the campus. IFRS staff can point you to areas where you can get a signal (depending on your smartphone brand).
What is the Future of Australia’s Maritime Security and SLOC Through Our Region?

Emeritus Professor Carl Thayer
Presentation to Future Strategic Leaders Program, Kioloa, NSW May 24, 2015
Australia’s Maritime Security
Increase in Merchant Shipping

2003-13

2003
- 3231 international ships
- Ave size: 36,514 gross tonnes
- Ave age: 10.4 years
- Made 18,160 calls at 71 Australian ports

2013
- 5447 international ships
- Ave size: 45,664 gross tonnes
- Ave age: 8.1 years
- Made 25,697 calls at 70 Australian ports
Introduction

• Australia has vital national interests:
  – Respect for international law and norms
  – Freedom of navigation
  – Unimpeded trade
  – Freedom of over flight in international airspace above the maritime domain
  – Rules-based regional order – peaceful settlement of disputes
Maritime Security

• Sea Lines of Communication (SLORC)
  – Commercial ships and vessels
  – Military ships and vessels

• Economic interdependence
  – Destabilising state actions or armed conflicts are dampened and unlikely
  – But there are still risks
The Indo-Pacific sea lanes

Source: Defence White Paper 2013, Department of Defence, Australian Government
Challenges

• China’s rise and military modernisation
  – Security dilemma
• Arms build up by regional states
  – Military technology and weapons systems
  – Growth of submarine fleets
  – Cruise missiles
• Hot spots
  – East China Sea, Taiwan, South China Sea
Extended Range of China’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles

Figure 2-4. Surface Antiship Cruise Missile Ranges

Range (Nautical Miles)
Figure 2-5. PLA(N) Ratio of Diesel to Nuclear Submarines

Figure 2-6. PLA(N) Ratio of Antiship Cruise Missile Equipped Submarines
Figure 3. The First and Second Island Chains. PRC military theorists conceive of two island “chains” as forming a geographic basis for China’s maritime defensive perimeter.
Figure 2-1. PLA(N) Fleet Composition

**North Sea Fleet**
- 3 Nuclear Attack Submarines
- 25 Diesel Attack Submarines
- 8 Destroyers
- 10 Frigates
- 11 Amphibious Ships
- 18 Missile Patrol Craft
- 6 Corvettes

**East Sea Fleet**
- 18 Diesel Attack Submarines
- 9 Destroyers
- 22 Frigates
- 20 Amphibious Ships
- 30 Missile Patrol Craft
- 6 Corvettes

**South Sea Fleet**
- 2 Nuclear Attack Submarines
- 4 Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines
- 16 Diesel Attack Submarines
- 9 Destroyers
- 20 Frigates
- 25 Amphibious Ships
- 38 Missile Patrol Craft
- 8 Corvettes

PLA(N) HQs
- North Sea Fleet HQ
- East Sea Fleet HQ
- South Sea Fleet HQ
• China’s military modernisation
• Surface combatants
• Aircraft carrier(s)
• Conventional and nuclear submarines
• Ballistic missiles
• Cruise missiles
Underwater sensors (fixed and mobile) to detect submarine movements
Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island
Figure 5-2. South China Sea Maritime Claims

Note: Nothing in this map reflects the United States Government acceptance of any maritime claim.
Figure 5-3: Regional Maritime Law Enforcement Comparison

- China: 205 vessels (95 Large, 110 Small)
- Indonesia: 8 vessels (3 Large, 5 Small)
- Japan: 78 vessels (53 Large, 25 Small)
- Malaysia: 2 vessels (2 Large, 0 Small)
- Philippines: 4 vessels (0 Large, 4 Small)

*Note: For the purposes of this graphic, Large vessels are greater than 1,000 tons; Small vessels are between 500–1,000 tons.*

- A number of older WAGGRs (non-naval oceanographic research ships) used as patrol ships were included.
- Navy AFT (stores ship) and AF (combat stores ship) vessels are not included.
- This includes WPCs (non-naval patrol craft) and WAGGRs non-naval intelligence trawler.
Chinese structures in disputed South China Sea
What China has in the Spratlys and Paracels:

**Woody Island**
An artificial harbour capable of docking vessels of up to 5,000 tons, a small airport with a 2.7km runway capable of handling fighter aircraft.

**Fiery Cross Reef**
Marine observation station, designated in 2011 as "main command headquarters", equipped with surface and air search radars. Armed with at least four high-powered naval guns.

**Gaven Reefs**
A permanent reef fortress, supply platforms and a harbour for navy patrol boats.

**Subi Reef**
A permanent reef fortress and supply platforms that can house 160 troops. Has a helipad and is armed with four twin barrel 37mm naval guns. Also houses a doppler weather radar.

**Spratly Islands**

**Mischief Reef**
A three-storey concrete building ringed with five octagonal concrete structures. Has search lights and radar.

**Johnson South Reef**
A three-storey concrete building ringed with gun emplacements, and a helipad. Said to be building an airstrip.

**Sources:** www.lib.utexas.edu; Centre for Intelligence and National Security Studies.

ST GRAPHICS
Mischief Reef
Fiery Cross Reef
Future Strategic Environment

- Australia’s security environment will be more challenging over the next 20 years
- Erosion of Australia’s historical military capability and technological advantages
- Strait line extrapolations of current trends risky
- What are the plausible alternatives?
Future Strategic Environment

• Strategic uncertainty
• Broader range of possible strategic futures
• Wild cards
  – Instability in China and/or Indonesia
  – Deterioration of China-US relations
  – Eruption of armed conflict
  – US abandonment
  – Climate change
In 1996, the Indonesian government submitted a proposal to the International Maritime Organization for recognition of three, north-south archipelagic sea lanes. But the Indonesian submission did not include “all normal passage routes” used for international navigation, as required by UNCLOS. Specifically, the Indonesian submission did not include a proposal for an east–west route through the southern part of its archipelago, from the Strait of Malacca through the Java Sea to the Arafura Sea.

Southeast Asia: Climate stress, recent conflict, global trade routes and choke points
What is the Future of Australia’s Maritime Security and SLOC Through Our Region?

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